Art Methodologies in Media Ecology

Art is no longer only art. Its methods are recapitulated, ooze out and become feral in combination with other forms of life. Art methodologies convey art’s capacities to enact a live process in the world, launching sensorial particles and other conjunctions in ways and combinations that renew their powers of disturbance and vision. Art methodologies are a range of ways of sensing, doing and knowing generated in art that are now circulating more haphazardly, perhaps less systematically, and requiring of a renewed form of understanding in order to trace and develop them. Art methodologies are cultural entities, embodied in speech, texts, sounds, behaviours and the modes of connection between things that share and develop, work on, art’s capacity of disturbance and the multi-scalar engorgement of perception.

As art systems proliferate, sometimes clenching into magnificently puckered dots, at other times unraveling into torrents of work and of life, art methodologies shuttle back and forth between entities in art systems and other domains with a certain range of freedoms, encountering and staging constraints. The generation and circulation of art methodologies invokes a formation of art that is not a conservative system pushing a named, trimmed and dealt with few up the heights of a pyramid built on the mangled achievements of many others, the classic paradigm, but a system that condenses and spews out moments of relationality. This happens with no necessary connection to named entities such as author, piece, project, owner, artist, provenance.

Art methodologies circulate, gain traction, shift, die off, amongst a more general flocculation of ideas, styles and modes of inflection. A diffusion is occurring in which art methodologies can pop up unexpectedly, not even recognising themselves as art, indeed possibly not even having that filiation in a genealogical sense, but connecting to it by means of arrival via a different phylogenetic route, or move in a way for which the idea of such a tracking is ludicrous. Such an understanding of art methodologies relies on an understanding of cultures as living processes involving stability and diversification that assemble circulation vectors, hot, cooling and intermixing, driven by invention and mutation, that act as pulsional zones for the circulation and invocation of signs and dynamics. That is, art methodologies, may exist at this scale, they might drive cultures or be sucked along in their wake.

Cultures, media ecologies mixed in with and passing through them, are conveyors of heat, materials and intelligence that at once provide a means, with their own particular rhythms, for the mix and conservation of modes and the multi-scalar conveyance of potentially mutational effects and dynamics, that themselves intermingle, block, and replicate dimensions of relationality, congealing as events, medial entities and processes of subjectivation. They certainly exist in and as the classically defined sense of media as systems for storage, processing and distribution of cultural material, but also pass along outwith them.


Some context is useful for describing this shift. One aspect might simply be the massification of art education undergone in some parts of the world since the middle of the Twentieth Century. To take the British Isles, if we assume that most graduates from art schools since the nineteen-sixties are largely still alive that means that there are several tens of thousands of people around with some kind of art training. Clearly not all of them are now artists or designers in a way that is recognised by art systems. What then happens to the ideas, ways of seeing the world and doing things that art allows for and entrains? I am not interested here in making an account of so-called ‘transferable skills’, but more in how accretions of cultural reflexes and modes of intensification moving through populations, at microscopic or larger scales, invent their own means of circulation, mutation and alliance.1

Another contributing current is the context of art as popular culture. One aspect would be the more systematic celebritisation of art, but another, more interesting instance would be the TV series Jackass, mixing the precisely traumatic end of art with bodies (i.e. that of Chris Burden), with skate culture, and the time-rhythm of TV comedy. A more simple example, the migration of art methodologies into pop music is reasonably well charted, and more interestingly remains a serious zone of contention, but to account for the phenomena it is necessary to do more than recognise the mapping of ideas and means from one relatively stable cultural domain into another. What are described here as possible contextualizing dynamics, are perhaps more adequately also understood as symptoms.

Equally, the circulation of art methodologies can be seen as intersecting with and feeding off a more general reflexivity, self-observation woven into the actions of the self. Here the entity functioning as a self may range from a production process, a dance move and its stability and variation, the repertoire of an erotic subculture at sizes scalable from the sub-individual to massifying level or a cybernetically self-monitoring national corpus or a personal fitness regime. Aesthetically charged entities and modes move through social and communicative formations, providing many other kinds of entity and dynamic with their justification and metre.2

In this way art methodologies as an idea is too fragile, or its scope too small, to conform to the totalising ambitions of movements demanding the complete subsumption of everyday life by art as characterised by, amongst others, the later Situationist International. What is described here is not a classic takeover bid but a shifting and opening of the permutational matrix of influences and possibilities between intersecting fields, the registration of an apparent torsion in cultural dynamics releasing the expressiveness of insubordination.3

Indeed, the proliferation of art methodologies into other forms of life cannot simply be understood to be good, democratic, enabling or humane in the way that everything is supposed to be participatorily dressed up nowadays; or simply grindingly joyful and Christian in the mode of a ‘don’t worry be happy’ brand of Spinozism. Art methodologies share part of the wider question of knowledge stemming from their contribution to the curse fingered by Paul Rabinow when he says, of the ‘anthropological problem’, that, ‘anthropos is that being who suffers from too many logoi’. (6) (This is to place surplus consciousness as a foundational condition, not as a calculable excess figured as emancipatory from or compensatory to social position). Art is a means of alienation, a precious source of self-mutilation. Anthropos is a residue and shaper of evolutionary forces, and one of its subcategories is man. Man, is a pathological animal, (Nietzsche) a sick animal, (Burroughs) a plague (Margulis) that is also traversed, used as a nutrient sac of protein-bearing pus or as a breeding ground for numerous other sicknesses, language and culture being virulent amongst them. To speak of art methodologies requires a way of recognising culture that is beyond man. We should be attentive to its particular traits and capacities but not get stuck in its skin.

In his discussions of Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze sets up the term ‘Method’ for particular attention (Deleuze 1988; Deleuze 1992). Method is the means by which Spinoza fabricates a machine capable of traveling across the universe and at the same time, dig into or suffuse microcosmic scalar realities, allowing them to be composable, alienable from common sense, into the realm of geometry and love. Methods are procedures, regimes, tricks on the self, which allow us to get beyond everyday perception and the rule of the commonplace

What is Philosophy? expands this vocabulary of method by describing the three modes, variations, variables and varieties that the book’s three planes, or ‘daughters of chaos’ philosophy, science and art produce as they cut, each in their different way, through the arcs of life, of chaos. (208). Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on sensual perception in art is immensely productive as one parameter of a fine speculative matrix, but it misses out many other kinds of dynamics running through both contemporary art practices and, for the context of this text, the art methodologies that run through, parallel to or away from them. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari’s work provides useful resources in describing art methodologies within and beyond art systems.

Variations are precisely what Eric Alliez produces in his striking commentary on What is Philosophy? They are a multiplication of resonances within an evolving conceptual domain: in the way that a body builder rips muscle in order to allow the tissue to increase its density and capacity, fibers multiplying, intensifying the capacity of others, philosophy rips thought, nurturing and anticipating, feasting on its growth.4 Variables are entities that are recognisable as being independently meaningful given the construction and adoption of a particular scientific perspectival system. Slowing down a sound in order to map it as a waveform; designing an instrument with sensors responsive to certain particles; or trimming or extending the lengths of a limb or tail-feather in order to match these variables against others, such as measured patterns of walking, or mate selection. Such variables are always rinsed out from a more inchoate gestative background. Chiming, not necessarily concording, with figures such as Brouwer and Poincaré, Deleuze and Guattari extend the classical mathematical formulations of intuitionism. Varieties, produced in Art, are dimensions arising from the intersection of art, as it slices across the fecund turmoil of life that partially autonomize sensation as a process of being, and through this autonomization, allow its to return with greater ferocity and passion into the world.

In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari’s account of art lacks engagement with art practices that do not have perception as their prime aim and mode or indeed as a mode in which they can be adequately experienced or understood. Interpretative approaches to art based on the primacy of affect can end up smothering other kinds of dynamics which may be present, active and productive.5 With the ascendancy of one interpretative category, art’s engagement with technicity or other forms of intellect equally risk being obscured. Despite the delimited scope of Deleuze and Guattari’s figuration of art in What is Philosophy? however, what it does provide is a vivid way of thinking through ideas and practices as dynamic elements in manifold systems.6 Art provides a lightning rod to sensations, a discipline for finding the means to allow sensation to couple itself with a multiple form of materiality, that of the work, painting or sculpture but its is also more than that. 7 Deleuze sets up as much in his earlier extended meditations on sensation’s interactions and inherence with logic or mathematical figurations, sensation never goes uncomplicated and without consequences. (Deleuze 1990; Deleuze 1994). When the pair’s last book turns to art’s affiliations and resonances with ecology and oikos, in the chapter ‘Percept, Affect and Concept’ the centre of gravity in the discussion becomes too multiple to leave perception anchored as the ruling principle of art and a whole universe of dynamics opens up to make their capacities felt. Sensation, coupled with its resonance in space, in the capacities of behaviours, and physical affordances becomes melodic, something that is built out of the interplay between things and which produces them as things. Given an ecological understanding of art, the idea of art as sole purveyor of the divided labour of perception falls by the wayside.8 Indeed, if art begins with the animal, the coevolutionary coupling between organism and place, such a coupling also requires something more than the vivid, gleeful and subtle account of the inter-fibrillic rush and curse of nature. The recognition of sensation by sensation generates intelligence, melody itself instigates pattern finding, and reflexivity is born. Ultimately, the book’s own trajectory gives way to a recognition of the kinds of indiscernability that the book’s three arcs, art, science and philosophy, themselves give rise to. From this vantage point, it is possible to see that the tracing of the three irreducible arcs is done so fastidiously, the better, by means of them, to join together so much that is incommensurable and thus to make a moirĂ© of their clean geometry. The three daughters of chaos are themselves just as much an effect of the melody between them and the beings that come into existence through and actualise these fields.

After the coupling of art with ecology (in ‘Percept, Affect and Concept’) it is sensation’s coupling with composition formed on the plane of aesthetics that becomes of importance. The terrain of what art might be, in Deleuze and Guattari’s reworking of it, expands somewhat: set off by the vividness of a phrase or a figuration of the world, ‘We become universes’. (Deleuze, 1994 169) Before it becomes a question of style however, amongst art’s capacity of variation, its ability to manufacture compounds of sensation, are discerned some great types, varieties of variation: the vibration; the clinch or embrace; and withdrawal, division and distension. These mark spatial and sensual forces of arrangement, the fluctuating distribution of closeness providing a moment of sheer transit, or a gasp, a pause, a shudder that opens up thought and serenity or the clenching that sends shocks from one element in the composition to another. (Deleuze, 1994 168) These figures occur later too. Revolutions do not occur solely as a chartable series of political events, nor necessarily in their structural or psychic denouement, but reside in the vibrations, clinches and openings at the moment of their making. (Deleuze, 1994 177) In revolutions at all scales becomings pile up to make cairns as way finding marks for others. (Can revolutions, like art entities, be said to embed persistent blocs of sensations that are untimely? Does the intensity of a holy orgiastic roarer with the livity of Abiezer Coppe always trump the betrayal of a Cromwell?). What is clear is that these capacities, for variation attributed to art are recapitulated, transposed into other forms of life: buzzing, breaking and conjugating in composition. This typology, this grammar of conjunction, differentiation and resonance moves across works, across bodies of work and disciplines, and beyond into forms of life. Following this outward trajectory of vibrations, clinches and openings it is possible to give a quick idea of the scope of other art methodologies, I do not want to present a full bestiary, but to set out a few observable kinds:

Second-order memetics. Memetics is concerned with analytic identification of coherent units of culture (at scales ranging from phonemes to religions), and the dynamics by which they mutate or find themselves conserved. It uses the tools of evolutionary theory to design metrics for tracking the longevity, fecundity and variability of such cultural elements. Second order memetics adds to this the insights gained by the recognition of the observer. Second order memetics is done live, as something itself susceptible to memetic analysis but also subjecting any ‘coldness’ of analysis to the torsion of multiple inherence in the cultural processes it recognises as being fugitive, mutational and wild.

Perception dilation. Art methodologies are sensual, but they also act on the material of sensation. Ducts of thought are engorged with sensation. Nerve bearing surfaces and cavities are subject to thickening and scraping, they sprout sweat, call forth tongues, carnality is encountered immediately, an immediate hammer blow to the whole body, but also slowed, distended stretched to points beyond their capacity to be borne without being added to. Whether they are austere or muscular and liquid, hypertrophic and maddened such art methodologies, like love, generate extended fields of carnality operating across different scales and registers of matter.

The unready. Art methodologies are not necessarily ‘ready’. Art combines a transversal handiness, with universal cackhandedness: a capacity to get stuff done to make something happen without the encumberance or guiding hand of prerequisite skill or the right equipment or training. Art’s angelic punkness is awkward and ravenous, insisting on the power to release its refined, curious ignorance in places where knowledge is securely lodged, spreading out its nervous system to catch the ripples of unheard of suns. Tools and aesthetic dynamics are opened up to objects and processes to which they are not standardised. If philosophy is a meta-discipline, art methodologies open up the space for a meta-antidiscipline that is broken, twitchy and brilliant.

Producing times. Art subjects itself to testing in real life, in real time but also in the time of art – a temporal dimension in which one is in dialogue with both ‘what is no longer possible’ and what has no yet been done, with resources from objects, traditions, ideas and waste distributed – sinking into and emerging from time. Such time is also related to the experiential thickness of carnality. Art stages the occurrence of things, their revelation or palpability in a way which resists their easy ability to be known. That is, art insists upon the staging of an engagement with it that includes the simultaneity, that is potentially endlessly maintained, of all stages of anticipation, delay and cognisance.

Feeding a this into a that. Aesthetic circuits and procedures, from an instant neural reflex to a method, from a certain glance to a particular device, establish themselves as scalar entities and dynamics within the compositional dynamics of life. They set out a field to which they refer, patches of colour, repeated movement, attention to certain streams of information, the idiosyncracies of a skill or a set of optics, habituations and patterns are formed. Given this, a clustered set of art methodologies can be seen in the transposition of such dynamics where the displacement of reference becomes a displacement of processing and modulation. Feeding a this into a that refuses the trivial arbitrary mapping of some media or electronic art, made almost inevitable by the easiness of digital media. Instead it engages precisely with the politics of parsing and the sensational universes of transformation.

If the above are indicators towards the recognition of art methodologies in the wild it follows that the proposal here is not to set up a possible hermeneutics in which a certain phrase, gesture, mark or breath can be recognised as providing an articulation space for say, the moments of intensive non-thought which abstract expressionism aimed at physically epitomising; the quick ironic perception of figures, whose recomposition as mass-reproducible drawings aimed at sticking a knife in the guts of a society that is equally as rancid as oneself, typified by say, George Grosz. Such precipitations from art clearly do occur and are valuable and productive, but these are not things that I want to track as a matter of priority and in part because there is no inherent need for them to occur ‘first’ in art. It might be more interesting to also look for isomorphisms of methods in art occurring ex natura.

In and out of Art

One of the ways in which it is useful to set out such a question is in relation to the navigation or creation of the boundary between art and non-art. This is a domain which is buzzing, engaged in oscillations which are at times crackling backwards and forwards so fast that they are indiscernible, ruptured or irrelevant, at others in a rigid tick-tocking and apportioning of function when it seems all that counts is the process and mechanisms of demarcation. These different regimes that set up pattern finding routines, or rinse out elements containing substances above a certain threshold, provided a key point of reference for the artist and acute theorist of art Alan Kaprow. Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy? ends with the remark that art is always dependent upon, if not inherent in, non-art. Whilst its set of scalar references is different, in Kaprow’s collection of essays and other texts, The Blurring of Art and Life, one of the key poles of activity is this flickering negotiation of art and non-art.

Compare the following as sample statements: in the survey text, ‘Experimental Art’ of 1966 Kaprow states, ‘This acceptance as art, no matter how late it comes, is in my view the goal’ (of experimental actions). (77) In the ‘Manifesto’ of the same year Kaprow, ‘The task of the artist is to avoid making art of any kind’. (81) It is of no interest to use such statements to posit a possible inconsistency in Kaprow’s work. What does garner interest is the means by which this tension is set up and navigated, by a to-ing and fro-ing between art and non-art. What Kaprow is after in both of these texts and in others, each following distinct trajectories or gambling on the play of experimental forces, is to set in motion a condition in which life, or experience, can be heightened. Indeed, ‘Experimental art can be an introduction to right living, and after that introduction art can be bypassed for the main course.’ (Kaprow 225) This continual back and forward across the boundary of art and non-art knots the fields together without caring for primacy in whether one grips or penetrates the other but reveling in the interplay of forces, codings and tensions that their interplay makes possible.

If one trajectory of art is that it frees itself first from God, then from nature, then from retinality, it also uses these opportunities to experiment with opening up voids and disarticulations within and from art itself. There are now multiple art worlds, or universes of reference which are not and cannot be boiled down to one set of terms, dynamics, infra-structures and art systems. None of this should be taken as implying that they are inherently of interest, what is important is that there is now a fundamental dissensus about what art is, where it is located, who activates it, and in what ways it is spoken about. There is for instance an art system devoted to science art collaboration in the united kingdom that is almost entirely fabricated by one biomedical public relations fund; or a range of counter institutions throughout northern Europe devoted to electronic art a genre which is rarely allowed in to other sections of the art world; there are commercial art sectors which are unable to recognise or even sense anything much beyond the end of their own always terminally involuted nervous systems; and there are immense pointless resources of hope poured into art as a quasi-mystical pyramid scheme.

Part of this dissensus is in the ravenous nature of art, that it takes on the world, but also its ironisation. Such a move produces a familiar paradox: the ready-made allowed anything to be taken as art, but it also allows art to be taken as anything, any old crap. A cleaner working in a gallery accidentally demolishes an installation and tucks it away into the rubbish. Everyone howls with delight, the news comics of course, but no-one more so than the artists.

And this is one point at which art methodologies detach themselves from art systems. Art systems, the familiar media ecologies of gallery, press, release, collection, blurb, statement, magazines, reviews, prices, festivals, sponsorships and so on, mesh with but do not subsume art methodologies. The fact that art is the equivalent of shit, can be set up as an authorised relationship both securely wallowing in its own wonderful ephemerality and as a gormless incarnation of the most valuable-per-square-millimeter single object in the world. Shit that is more diamond encrusted than a crown is the happy horizon of much contemporary art, but it misses what is leaking out sideways from the two poles of this outworn paradox.

The dissensus of art is in part what makes such a mobility possible, but it is also something inherent to art as a set of internally differentiating and symbiotic tendencies and capacities. Deleuze writes of the way in which, ‘the eye, having abandoned its haptic function and become optical subordinated itself to the tactile as a secondary power’. (2003 127) His writing on Bacon roils with shifting alliances and migrations of senses and material. The optical dismantles the manual and the haptic relaxes the relation between eye and hand, colour and line.

The corporealities that art invents allow subtle filiations and perversions to run their fibers through the painter, the user of the work, the organs, modes and entities that art systems grow by, and ultimately, what sprouts from them, and by these means art exceeds its own organisation. Eye, hand, canvas, brain, paint, light, confluences sprawl and fight, egg each other on, thrown together or out of whack by the use of photographs, sitters, a piece of land, a jar of flowers. Willem de Kooning’s later paintings are well known for their way with colour and the acrobatic movement of their labile juicy brush, but also for the question of whether his gradual contraction of Parkinson’s disease during their production reduced him to a mannerist assemblage of learned muscle movements, merely making twitches amongst paint placed ready for him on the pallette. At what level do we situate an art methodology? A residual nervous trick, a spasm? With some justification, Deleuze and Guattari refuse the pictures produced by the mad or by children a properly named place as art. But I would suggest that the categorical edge they set down is too sharp. Art methodologies allows a perspective that is ‘beneath’ this scale focusing instead on the populations of reflexive entities that traverse ‘works’, bringing them to life, but also sometimes exceeding them or being born there.


One such art methodology that Kaprow used in order to make sense of this boundary transition between art and non-art is attention. Recognising that ‘Attention alters what is attended’. (Kaprow 236) Kaprow mobilised the phenomenon of the observer, a state of recursive interaction within a system as an everyday technique running at different moments, according to different rhythms through both art and other forms of life. Attention was both part of life, but could also be performed, attended to itself, with another person, with objects and in relation to a media system such as video and thus folded into other circuits of attention. Attention was something that could be mobilised in daily life in actions such as hand washing. The method was to carry out such an action with the coding, the condition, that what is so enacted be parsed, paid attention, to think about its full set of interrelations with the world, and the act so reflected upon, as it occurs, as a sensual and thoughtful process.

Kaprow’s technique of paying attention, partly as an engagement with the ideas of John Cage has its roots in Natural Philosophy, certain aspects of Zen and its plunge into mundanity, Stoicism, every moment at which one tries to calm or excite or sensitise or flay consciousness to the point that it can receive the fullness at many scales, of what is occurring around and through it. It is the cheapest, most available of perceptual modification: an attempt to forestall humans’ propensity to ‘inattentional blindness’. (Mack & Rock 2000) In the work of Gary Snyder the same figure, wiping away grease from the hands after work, appears as an intermediate, and hence very rich moment. Accidentally the mind opens to a ‘calm and clarity’, when ‘glancing up at the passing clouds’. (Snyder 24) Paying attention is to ask in what way is it possible to set up fields or domains of resonance with others? (animals, social processes, visualisation systems, soap, water, hands) as if for the first time, at which point everything needs be taken into account but also with the knowledge of practice, of tacit everydayness.

Art methodologies do not necessarily endure as blocs of sensation. More wraithlike, they also disappear, vapourise, become inadequate, but also emerge out of sensation’s doubling, the recognition or apprehension of melody to be found in attention and elsewhere. The question is not necessarily as with larger assemblages of entities and dynamics, to find ways of making them more incisive, disrupting and revealing. Such things are too substantial, too coherent at multiple scales to qualify simply as art methodologies. However, art methodologies will traverse from one scalar reality or set of selves or relation of dimensionality across to others and, knowing this, allow them to be worked on. Art methodologies in the wild, without a lien back to more enduring entities, from subjectival aggregations to institutions or economies of whatever degree of fictivity are inherently difficult to mark down, to track or to prescribe with a uniform metric. Art methodologies are out, and that is perhaps enough.

Matthew Fuller

With thanks to Fonds voor Beeldende Kunsten, Vormgeving en Bouwkunst of The Netherlands for support of the production of this text.

1 ‘Transferable skills’ is educational audit jargon for something you learn by doing one thing that you can also use for another thing. For instance, if you can walk to the photocopier, you can also walk to the bookshelf.
2 Scott Lash and John Urry note in a similar vein that at a time when ‘aesthetic reflexivity comes to pervade social processes’ (54) there is a greater and more ‘democratic’ (50) distribution of symbol systems allowing for various observers to suggest that ‘postmodernism is in effect the generalization of aesthetic modernism to, not just an elite, but the whole of the population.’ (133)
3 See also Fuller 2006.
4 See also Antic and Fuller, 2006.
5 There are a number of examples to be found in recent theoretical work where the renewed respectability of relegating art simply to the domain of affect also becomes an acceptable means of effectively refusing to acknowledge the complex politics of work which might indeed involve affect as becomings, but which multiply them, making their own becomings of becoming that are coupled with other dimensions of relationality, not being reducible to them.
6 Theirs is also a figuration that is historically free-floating, important in that it releases the power of untimeliness, of refusing the lock-step of the one thing after another. Indeed, art as a media system that includes the function of storage, ‘preserves’ (Deleuze, 1994 163) forming barricades of percepts and affects against time, or constellations that leak through it, setting up a reserve that is outside time or more accurately, in consciously evental time.
7 Deleuze brilliantly formulates the former approach in his book on Bacon (Deleuze 2003).
8 For a related discussion on art and ecology see Fuller 2008.


Alliez, A., The Signature of the World, trans. E. R. Albert and A. Toscano (London: Continuum, 2004).

Deleuze, G., Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. R. Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988).

Deleuze, G. The Logic of Sense, trans. M. Lester with C. Stivale, ed. C. V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

Deleuze, G., Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. M. Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992).

Deleuze, G. Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Deleuze, G. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. D. W. Smith (London: Continuum, 2003).

Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell (London: Verso, 1994).

Fuller, M., ‘The Expressivenes of Insubordination’, The Hartware Guide to Irrational, eds. I. Arns and J. Lillemose (Dortmund: Hartware MedienKunstVerein, 2006).

Fuller, M., ‘Art For Animals’, Deleuze/Guattari & Ecology, ed. B. Herzogenrath (London: Palgrave, 2008).

Kaprow, A., Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, ed. J. Kelley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

Lash, S., and J. Urry, ‘Economies of Signs and Space’ (London: Sage, 1993)

A. Mack and I. Rock, Inattentional Blindness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

Rabinow, P., Anthropos Today, Reflections on Modern Equipment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).

Snyder, G., The Practice of the Wild (New York: Northpoint Press, 1990).